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Companions on a Serendipitous Journey 
 
Nicola Lacey* 
 
It has not been the journey that I originally planned.  During my school days, my main intellectual 
love was of literature, and my imaginative world was peopled by novels and poems.  However, like 
many of my contemporaries in an era of rapidly expanding higher education, I was the first of my 
family to go to university, and my parents were keen that their only daughter should have not only 
the educational opportunities which they had missed, but a career which would guarantee her 
financial independence. Literature definitely didn’t fit the bill!  I will never forget the look of steely 
determination which crossed my mother’s face when one of my teachers mentioned to her that the 
school regarded me as a good candidate for law.  An extended tussle ensued.  I triumphed in round 
one, and applied to university to read English. But I hadn’t reckoned on my mother’s stamina, and 
she gained the day when I finally caved in under sustained pressure and changed my application to 
law. I was thrilled to gain a place at UCL – I could just about manage the idea of being a lawyer as 
long as I could be in the big city… (I grew up in a sleepy suburb.)  But some ambivalence about the 
subject choice must have remained, and I duly hated my first term and tried desperately to change 
courses.  The English department at UCL decisively refused to entertain an application to transfer.  I 
didn’t understand it at the time, but this was the first of the many strokes of good luck which have 
helped to shape my career.   
 
Things began to open up for me, intellectually, in my second year, which included the criminal law 
course.  I was immediately drawn to a subject so clearly open to moral and political analysis, and 
when I alighted upon H.L.A. Hart’s Punishment and Responsibility1 the applied philosophical 
jurisprudence which came to dominate the early part of my career utterly captured my imagination.  
I think this was because I was drawn to the intricacy which it shared with doctrinal legal analysis, 
while being motivated by its engagement with urgent practical problems and questions of 
justification.  It is a puzzle to me today that I didn’t draw more links between these issues raised by 
criminal law and the sociological classics to which I had been introduced in a half unit first year 
course.  Perhaps it was too much too soon; perhaps I was still somewhat resistant to the whole idea 
of studying law.  But the fact is that I didn’t really connect with those sociological issues until 
studying a graduate course in criminal justice at Oxford a couple of years later.  So if I had to choose 
a single book which inspired my intellectual journey, and which opened up the possibility of an 
academic career to me, it would have to be that luminous collection of Hart’s essays, with their 
vision of the centrality of responsibility to the legitimacy of criminalisation and punishment in 
modern societies, and their intricate picture of the ways in which ideas of responsibility are inscribed  
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in legal doctrines, legal processes, sentencing and punishment.   I continue to treasure and to re-
read the book quite regularly, almost always finding in it some insight or subtlety which I had missed 
last time around – or perhaps which I had simply forgotten.  And though my own intellectual taste 
has moved in more socio-legal, historical and institutional directions, Punishment and Responsibility 
has influenced and informed much of my work.   
 
I am not, however, going to frame this autobiographical essay around the influence of a single book.  
This is partly because I have already written quite a bit about Punishment and Responsibility, and its 
impact on my work is probably fairly plain.  More importantly, I don’t feel that my intellectual 
journey has been shaped by any one dominating source.  It has been more a case of scholarly hitch-
hiking than a carefully planned tour; a voyage marked by fascinating detours and unplanned 
encounters.  Certainly, these have generated cumulative insights which have informed my decision 
about where to head – or try to head – next.  But there has been no one, nor even a handful, of 
moments of decisive revelation or arrival. So I rather resist the ‘great books’ view of academic life.  
And while, like all academics, a range of key books have been constant companions, the course of 
my journey – not to mention its pleasure and interest – has been shaped as much by relationships as 
by reading; as much by the institutions in which I have worked as by purely intellectual inspiration – 
not to mention by sheer happenstance.  So I am going to follow and even extend the example of one 
or two of my predecessors in this series and write more generally about the key turning points in my 
intellectual journey, and the resources and relationships which prompted them.   
 
As I have already explained, Hart, and Jeremy Bentham behind him, stand for the first glimmerings 
of real intellectual excitement in the first phase of my career.  So my main focus while a graduate 
student at Oxford, and indeed underpinning my first book and most of my early articles, was on 
analytical jurisprudence and political theory.  I was fortunate to be part of a philosophy reading 
group involving, among others, Bob Hargrave, Mark Lacey, and Jeremy Waldron, all of whom 
significantly shaped my ideas at the time.  But, looking back, I can see that my two years in Oxford 
also laid the foundations for new strands in my work. The intellectual gymnastics of high end 
analytical jurisprudence were invigorating up to a point, but began to feel arid.  So a move to the 
normative theory which had attracted me in Hart’s Punishment and Responsibility remained, and 
remains, appealing in its more purposive and practical application.  The jurisprudence scene in 
Oxford at the time was enriched by political theory debates around Rawls, Nozick, Taylor and 
Dworkin, and these hugely enlivened my life as a graduate student. But it gradually dawned on me 
that having a clear view of what one would ideally like to do, or to be the case, and why, was of 
limited use if one had no sense of how to get there. And that implied a whole new range of 
questions: historical questions about how things have come to be as they are; social science 
questions about the conditions of existence of social institutions like law, and about their potential 
to shape human behaviour; cultural questions about how ideas are formed, stabilised and 
transmitted.  These questions presented themselves to me most forcefully as a result of my first 
encounter with Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish2, with its marvellous historical sweep and 
willingness both to generalise and to attend to the details of social practices and the discourses in 
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terms of which they are framed.  (To his great credit, Foucault’s critical object Bentham also had, in 
Herbert Hart’s words, an ‘extraordinary combination of a fly’s eye for detail, with an eagle’s eye for 
illuminating generalizations applicable across wide areas of social life’3  - a capacity which 
underpinned his status as a reformer as much as a philosopher.)  But, ironically, my dawning interest 
in history and the social sciences was not prompted exclusively by my encounter with Foucault. 
Equally, it derived from what remains my most extended analytical jurisprudence workout, namely 
my BCL thesis, which engaged with the distinction between momentary and non-momentary legal 
systems developed by Joseph Raz in his brilliant if intractable The Concept of a Legal System.4  Raz’s 
argument was that the momentary system, consisting of all the laws valid in a single legal system at 
any one time, is quite distinct from the legal system understood as a socio-historical entity existing 
over space and time.  My reaction to this – that even though the distinction was useful for some 
purposes, it couldn’t be right that the contents of the former could be identified, interpreted and 
fully understood in isolation from an understanding of the latter – has informed virtually all my 
subsequent legal scholarship.  
 
In 1981 I returned to UCL, my work building mainly on the jurisprudence and political theory roots 
which had been strengthened as a BCL student in Oxford, and nourished by regular visits to the 
energetic and welcoming centres of more pluralistic legal philosophy in Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Stirling.  But the socio-legal seeds which had been planted during my criminal justice studies began 
to germinate, not least as a result of William Twining’s arrival as a colleague.  William influenced me 
in two main ways: first, he encouraged me to see that evidence, and procedure more generally, 
were key to the way criminal law worked; second, he commissioned Celia Wells, Dirk Meure and me 
to write a text and materials book for the Law in Context Series.  Work for that first edition of 
Reconstructing Criminal Law,5 of which the close relationship which I formed with Celia was a key 
part, was one of the most intellectually exhilarating experiences I have had.  This was because the 
decision to try to write a book which started not from legal categories – groups of offences – but 
rather from social categories – the problems which criminal law purports to address, the social 
arrangements and institutions which it claims to protect – necessitated a huge amount of reading in 
history and a range of social sciences as well as legal scholarship.  There is much more than can be 
contained in this essay to say about the inspiration I gained from that reading, but let me pick out a 
few examples.  Inspired by American legal scholars Jerome Hall and George Fletcher, I decided to 
frame the property chapter, for which I had primary drafting responsibility, in terms of history. I can 
still remember the excitement I felt when I first read E.P. Thompson’s Whigs and Hunters.6  I had to 
put it down and walk around every half hour or so, just to let the ideas and images sink in.  
Thompson’s extraordinary achievement in bringing the lives of the victims of the Black Acts vividly to 
the page while never losing sight of the macro forces which drove this inglorious episode in criminal 
law history, drawing out its theoretical implications, still amazes and inspires me.  As I moved closer 
to the present, I became interested in how property offenders rationalise their conduct – as well as 
how the ‘law-abiding’ rationalise their judgements of criminality -  in a world in which the norms of 
entrepreneurial capitalism are so hard to distinguish from the norms of sharp practice on the wrong 
side of the law.  Here Gerald Mars’ unputdownable anthropological study, Cheats at Work, opened 
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some important windows for me.7   In working on the introductory chapter for the book, which sets 
up its theoretical framework, when I reached the point of tracing how cases made their way through 
the criminal process, Doreen McBarnet’s Conviction8 opened my eyes to the key insight that, Herbert 
Packer’s conceptual dichotomy notwithstanding, the due process norms conceived by lawyers as the 
bedrocks of criminal law’s (ethical) legitimacy could operate to legitimate (practically) some pretty 
instrumental crime control logics – an illumination which prefigured an enduring interest in the 
ideological qualities of legal doctrine.  And for the public order chapter, I found huge inspiration 
from the work of Stuart Hall and his colleagues in Policing the Crisis,9 in terms not only of the 
influence of race and class in the fundamental development of criminal law in its social context, but 
that of contemporary politics and power relations more generally.  
 
These were all quite revolutionary ideas to me; and I am sure I am not the only socio-legal scholar 
who has sometimes felt a degree of intellectual schizophrenia as I have struggled to bring the 
insights of one part of my work to bear on another.  (How can it have taken so long for these 
questions to present themselves to me? JLS readers will reasonably ask!  I can only answer that a 
relatively conventional legal education in those days did not invite thinking outside the doctrinal box.  
It doesn’t seem quite an adequate answer to me, but it does help to explain why Duncan Kennedy’s 
‘Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy’10 spoke to me immediately and powerfully when I first 
read it, and remains a key entry in my academic lexicon.)  By the mid 1980s, I was beginning to 
discover that the conceptual worlds of both doctrinal analysis and normative legal and political 
theory could be quite unwelcoming to interrogation from the point of view of interpretive and 
empirical social science. But, gradually, the glimmers gleaned from my work on Reconstructing 
Criminal Law began to show, albeit dimly, in State Punishment.11  I still remember the series editor 
who had commissioned the latter, the philosopher Ted Honderich, booming at me when he read the 
first draft, ‘What is all this stuff about social meaning?’  To Ted’s great credit, he was ultimately 
convinced of the work it was doing in my argument.  But it was a reminder of the challenge which 
had to be met if these substantively overlapping but methodologically mutually intolerant paradigms 
were to be brought into some form of productive dialogue.   
 
In 1984, my journey took another turn, back up the M40 to Oxford.  This time my intellectual 
aspirations, though they still encompassed it, reached beyond jurisprudence and extended 
definitively in a socio-legal direction. But my affiliations and assumptions were about to receive 
another productive shock in the dual (and related) shapes of critical legal studies and feminist 
theory.  It turned out that there was a sizable group of law colleagues across Oxford who, like me, 
were in search of an intellectual space beyond the common law/doctrinal and 
jurisprudential/philosophical orthodoxies which had shaped the law faculty in the post-war period; 
and several of them, unlike me, had extended their horizons by venturing abroad for their graduate 
studies.  We formed a reading group, which met in Hugh Collins’ rooms in Brasenose, and spent a 
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couple of years working our way through some of the key texts of the American critical legal studies 
movement, including of course some powerful feminist texts by scholars like Clare Dalton, Catharine 
MacKinnon and Frances Olsen.  I had a small taste of the intellectual divisions which were already 
exploding in some US Law Schools when one colleague declined an invitation to the reading group 
on the basis that he ‘didn’t attend events for which I need a party card’.   But that fundamental 
insight that knowledge is inextricably linked with power, is constructed from a point of view which is 
at once, significantly, obscured - which had been gradually impinging on my consciousness since 
reading Foucault, and re-encountering Marx in the interstices of my work on Reconstructing Criminal 
Law - was now moving to the centre of my intellectual agenda.  So it was not surprising that critical 
legal studies appealed to me; and the discussions we enjoyed over those experimental years, as well 
as a visit to Stanford in 1992, were truly formative.   
 
On the other hand, the critical legal studies genre was, to my post-Reconstructing Criminal Law 
taste, too exclusively concerned with legal doctrine, its genesis and effects – reproducing, it seemed 
to me, for all its iconoclasm and political energy, and notwithstanding the multi-disciplinary 
expertise of several of its leading proponents, something of the narrow legal focus of the doctrinal 
scholarship which it took as its critical object.  My outlook was already firmly socio-legal in the sense 
that I saw the social, political and economic institutions, forces and contexts within which legal 
doctrines were created, interpreted and enforced as utterly central to legal scholarship: indeed to 
the very meaning of law. And the closest echoes of my own emerging view in the critical literature 
came – perhaps not surprisingly – from the so-called ‘fem-crits’, and, a little later, from the emerging 
voices of feminist critical race scholars like Angela Harris, Patricia Hill Collins, Kimberle Crenshaw and 
Patricia Williams.  The feminist aspect of the CLS debate also spoke to me, however, for another 
reason, so far glossed over in this autobiographical account.  It still amazes me to write it: I had 
completed my entire legal education virtually without being taught a woman.  The late Anne de 
Moor sat in on some seminars in one BCL course; but otherwise my five years at university had been 
an entirely woman-teacher-free zone. This despite the fact that women were already getting on for 
a half of the student cohort at UCL and of other universities free from Oxford’s and Cambridge’s 
history of formal exclusions.12 
 
Inevitably, this under-representation of women in the legal academy was reflected in the sources I 
was reading.  It pains me to see that only one of the texts I have cited as major influences up to the 
time of the Oxford reading group was by a woman. (I note that a similar gender proportion marks 
the other contributions to this series, not excluding the single such contribution by a woman, my LSE 
colleague Carol Harlow.13)  There I was, a woman academic whose pre-university inspirations had 
been Simone de Beauvoir, George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, in the midst of an intellectual world in which 
women’s voices were virtually silent.  Yet I hadn’t made the least fuss about it.  There is little point in 
glossing over this fact, which speaks to the strange compartments in which we live our complex and 
often contradictory lives  It surprises, indeed disappoints me. But the fact is that until I became a 
teacher, and began to hear from my women students about the gender barriers to pupillages and 
articles14 in the legal profession, even my experience of arriving in Oxford in 1979 in the first intake 
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of women students at University College, greeted at the Lodge by the Head Porter supposing he 
would have to get used to ‘the likes of you’, seemed like a piece of eccentric Oxbridge exotica rather 
than a political fact to be engaged with, resisted and, if at all possible, changed.  But arriving at New 
College in 1984 as – for the first three years – the only woman with a vote on the Governing Body, 
and one of only two women in the Senior Common Room, was a radicalising experience, and it had a 
profound, and positive, impact on my intellectual as much as on my political life.  So various dots 
began to join up, and gradually the itinerary for the next part of my intellectual journey was 
sketched out. 
 
The ‘femcrit’ literature spoke to my emerging feminist consciousness and sense of the gender gap in 
my own education, as well as my impulse to subject legal arrangements to critical scrutiny.  But it 
didn’t always feed my socio-legal agenda; nor did it fully engage with the questions of normative 
reconstruction beyond the law which I still felt to be pressing. But two further literatures which I 
began to encounter as a result of both teaching and research interests, as well as my close 
relationships with editorial colleagues in setting up the journal Social and Legal Studies, now helped 
to bring these different questions into a meaningful relationship with one another.  First, a number 
of pioneers in feminist criminology – Frances Heidensohn, Carol Smart, Ngaire Naffine and Pat 
Carlen particularly come to mind – were doing truly illuminating work which reinserted the 
construction and treatment of women into criminal justice studies, in the process transforming our 
understanding of how social control is exercised in a number of different contexts, with decisive 
implications for socio-legal scholarship.  Second, this was a time of huge energy and innovation in 
feminist philosophy and political theory, with scholars like Seyla Benhabib, Drucilla Cornell, Nancy 
Fraser, Moira Gatens, Carol Pateman, Anne Phillips, and Iris Marion Young reshaping the landscape 
of political theory, as well as building bridges between political and legal theory, between theory and 
praxis, and between anglo-american and continental theoretical traditions.  By this time I was deeply 
involved in feminist politics in the small but complicated world of Oxford University, through which I 
met the sociologist and political theorist Elizabeth Frazer.  Appropriately enough, our political and 
personal connection generated another intellectual project via the medium of a reading group 
thinking through the synergies and tensions between feminism and communitarianism, which led to 
a co-authored book, The Politics of Community15 – an incredibly exciting time and my first experience 
of true interdisciplinary collaboration.  If I had to pick out a small number of  formative books from 
this period, they would be Seyla Benhabib’s magnificent Situating the Self ,16 for its bringing together 
of competing ethical and political traditions in a mode of argument which combines sparkling 
precision with great passion; Carol Smart’s Feminism and the Power of Law17 - a reminder that 
sociologists can write excellent legal scholarship; Ngaire Naffine’s Law and the Sexes 18, a powerful 
demonstration of the applicability of feminist theory across the legal spectrum; and Pat Carlen’s 
Women’s Imprisonment,19 which remains for me one of the most impressive empirical studies: one 
in which a meticulous analysis of micro-dynamics and small institutional arrangements builds up into 
a compelling picture of a total institution. 
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1995 took me back to London, where I spent just over two years at Birkbeck, before moving to LSE in 
1998.  Birkbeck was a cauldron of theoretical innovation, and an ideal place in which to continue my 
work on feminist legal theory,20 both because of the shared interest of several other colleagues, and 
because gender issues had found their way more fully on to the syllabus than at any other law 
school in which I have worked.  I enjoyed my encounters with the imaginative and poetic work of 
French feminist writers like Luce Irigaray, and experimented with psychoanalytic analyses of law 
such as those deriving from Jacques Lacan, and with the radical constructivism of Judith Butler.  But I 
felt that feminist theory was beginning to suffer from some of the same problems as political and 
legal philosophy: viz. that as its technical brilliance and sophistication increased, its engagement with 
the practical political issues which motivate any feminist inquiry began to become attenuated.  So 
the main intellectual turn at this point in my career – and one which has shaped one major strand of 
my work ever since – was historical.  My encounter with Thompson and other historical scholarship 
while working on Reconstructing Criminal Law – as with Alan Norrie, who was working on his Crime, 
Reason and History21 for the same series during the same time, and with David Garland’s Punishment 
and Welfare 22 – were now given new impetus by conversations with Lindsay Farmer, and by the 
freedom to design core aspects of the criminal law course in historical terms.  At last I was beginning 
to see – or think I was seeing! – a way to bring historical insights to bear on the issues which had 
dominated my earlier analytic and doctrinal work, arguing that the key concepts in terms of which 
doctrinal fields such as criminal law are framed and legitimated – responsibility being a key example 
– themselves had histories, and cultural, political and institutional conditions of existence, which 
helped to explain their shape and impact. These, it seemed to me, underpinned the structural links 
between the momentary and non-momentary legal systems – links which tended to be obscured in 
contemporary criminal law theory’s inclination to see concepts like responsibility in ahistorical, even 
metaphysical terms.   
 
The key texts for me in the early part of this work were Blackstone’s Commentaries;23 James 
Fitzjames Stephen’s monumental late Victorian works on criminal law, in particular his General 
View;24 and Martin Wiener’s marvellous Reconstructing the Criminal.25  Blackstone’s extended and 
creative effort to rationalise the criminal law in terms of a distinctive category of public wrongs 
focused on the substance of criminal prohibitions – what Glanville Williams two centuries later 
called the ‘special part’ of criminal law – still resonated with Stephen’s confident late Victorian 
rendering of the social role and rationale of criminal law, albeit complicated by a greater sensitivity 
for the importance of procedure and some emergent sense of the nascent general doctrines, 
particularly in the defences.  By the mid 20th Century these had come so to dominate the scholarly 
vision of criminal law – as exemplified in Williams’ magisterial Criminal Law: The General Part26 in 
1953 – that Williams never felt the need to write the second volume in the Special Part as originally 
planned.  And Wiener’s exploration of the diverse social, scientific and political sources which 
shaped the conception of the criminal in the period which saw the construction of a formalised, 
professionalised criminal law system in England and Wales, along with their implications for that 
system, stands as one of the most inspiring reads of my career.  A blissful year at the 
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Wissenschafstzkolleg in Berlin in 1999-2000 gave me an extended opportunity to start to shape this 
project, which ultimately resulted in the publication of In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, 
Interests and Institutions in 2016.  A particularly important part of the Kolleg’s institutional context 
were its extraordinary library facilities, which brought books from all over Germany to visiting 
scholars’ desks.  I will always remember the excitement – and perplexity – which I felt when the 
librarian delivered to me a first edition of Leslie Stephen’s biography of his brother James – with its 
pages as yet uncut.   
 
In recounting the germination and growth of the historical interests laid down in Oxford, rekindled at 
Birkbeck, and nurtured at LSE, I have however been ignoring a second, rather different strand in my 
intellectual development, and one which demonstrates the importance of contingency in any 
biographical trajectory.  In 1990, my husband, economist–turned–political scientist David Soskice, 
moved to a research position in Berlin, and for much of the next seventeen years I made regular, and 
often extended, visits to Berlin.  In a heroic attempt to bring my personal and professional lives into 
a manageable geographical relationship (!) – and prompted by genuine curiosity about how a 
country so close to the UK could feel so utterly different in many ways – I embarked for the first time 
on some comparative research. I was lucky enough to find a wonderful collaborator in Lucia Zedner, 
and learned a huge amount from her as we toured Germany researching community crime 
prevention – much written about but, as it turned out, much less often practised:  a key socio-legal 
lesson for us both.   
 
At this time, David and colleagues in the unit which he directed at the Wissenschaftszentrum were 
developing a new paradigm in comparative political economy – the now extremely well known 
Varieties of Capitalism,27  which argues that advanced capitalist democracies come in two main 
families, liberal and coordinated economies, which function in importantly different ways.  During 
my visits to Berlin, I would often sit in on their seminars; and I found myself wondering whether the 
comparative model which they were discussing might have any application to the differences 
between the penal systems of otherwise relatively similar advanced capitalist democracies.  There 
seemed to be a significant gap in the literature here. Despite a profusion of books and articles 
exploring ‘the politics of criminal justice’ or ‘law and order politics’, criminologists had made little 
effort to acquaint themselves with the sort of political science analysis of differently configured 
electoral and political systems which might make a systematic difference to the trajectory of criminal 
justice policy; conversely, political scientists seemed curiously incurious about what is, after all, the 
most draconian form of state power short of waging war.  The pioneering work of a few scholars – 
notably David Garland’s The Culture of Control 28 and James Q Whitman’s Harsh Justice29- had 
rekindled interest in the sorts of macro analyses of penality prefigured by Rusche and Kirchheimer’s 
monumental (if monolithic) Punishment and Social Structure.30 But the time seemed ripe for a more 
systematically comparative analysis, building on the resources being created not only by the 
Varieties of Capitalism scholars but also by works such as Gosta Esping Andersen’s influential Three 
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Worlds of Welfare Capitalism31 and Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy. 32  But I was busy with 
history, and my work on this topic was for some years confined to interstitial reading and to debates 
with David and his colleagues in Berlin, and with David Garland and his colleagues during visits to 
NYU.   
 
But in 2006, I had the great good fortune to secure a three year Leverhulme Fellowship, and 
although I was meant to be working exclusively on my historical project, this space made it possible 
for me to accept an invitation to deliver the Hamlyn Lectures in 2007.33  It was the perfect 
opportunity to think through my ideas about the comparative political economy of punishment: and 
you can imagine my excitement when I discovered that patterns of increasing severity in punishment 
tracked the distinction between liberal and coordinated economies quite closely.  Correlations 
between punitiveness and variables such as generous welfare states, levels of inequality and degrees 
of social trust had already been quite widely noted in the literature.  But what the scholarship of Hall 
and Soskice, Lipjhart and Esping-Andersen made possible was a much more ambitious attempt to 
map the causal mechanisms underlying these correlations. This was because of their closely grained 
account of the varying shape and interlocking dynamics of a range of institutions which lie beyond 
the criminal justice system yet which shape the emergence of criminal justice policy: the electoral 
system, the labour market, the welfare state, finance, employers, unions, the bureaucracy. These 
institutional differences, it seemed to me, allowed us to pinpoint much more accurately than 
previous structural accounts such as those deriving from the Marxist tradition the fluctuations of 
penal policy in different countries over time.  My continuing dialogue (and now research 
collaboration) with David, and my regular exchanges with his colleagues during that time, have had 
an enduring impact on how I think about criminal justice, as well as introducing me to an entirely 
new fund of resources which can be brought to bear not only on criminal justice but on the impact 
and implications of legal regulation more generally.   
 
Finally, another lengthy and enjoyable research detour, and one which took me back to my earliest  
intellectual tastes, had proposed itself in the form of my first adventure into the terrain of law and 
literature.  My Leverhulme Fellowship gave me the chance to reconnect with my historical project 
after a period of fairly intense administrative responsibility at LSE.  I decided to spend the summer 
vacation of 2006 recovering from surfeit of emails and meetings, and reconnecting with the 
lifeworlds of the 18th and 19th centuries, by immersing myself in some of those novels one means to 
read but never gets round to.  I was working with a thesis that criminal responsibility in the 18th 
Century was importantly understood in terms of bad character; and I knew that there had been an 
extended debate about character in the 18th century novel.  So I set off to France with a huge pile of 
Penguin Classics and plenty of sun tan lotion.  Soon afterwards, the first woman Dean at Toronto 
Law School, Mayo Moran, invited me to give a public lecture the following year; to do so on 
International Women’s Day; and, of course, to do so on an issue dealing with law and gender.  I was 
aware of an interesting debate started by an article by Malcolm Feeley and Deborah Little,34 which 
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argued that there was a fascinating exception to the (equally fascinating) rule that women constitute 
a small minority of those proceeded against for crimes in most systems: late 17th and early 18th 
Century London.  I had not conceived my historical project in specifically gender terms – again, I ask 
myself why not ??!  - so I asked  for a bit of time to think.  And by some quirk of fate, the very next 
book in the pile waiting to be read was Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders35 – a novel which was set at one 
end of Feeley and Little’s ‘exceptional‘ period, and written as it drew to a close. Moll immediately 
presented herself as part of the answer to the question of why at that particular time it had become 
more natural to think in terms of women as offenders – and of women offenders, even dishonest 
and frankly sexual women - as heroines.  Could one think of a 19th century, or even late 18th century, 
equivalent?  Clearly not.  
 
So how had Moll become displaced by literary heroines in the style of the unfortunate Tess of the 
d’Urbervilles, who became the end point of my story? 36 Along the road which led to my provisional 
answer to this question, as well as consuming dozens of intoxicating novels, and reconnecting with 
my original love, I also cured myself of any lingering regrets about not studying English.  For I 
discovered that literary theory often left analytical jurisprudence and the further reaches feminist 
social theory in the shade in terms of inaccessibility and abstractness. But I did enjoy a large number 
of marvellous books on literary, legal and social history, of which, once again, I can mention only a 
few: Jan–Melissa Schramm’s magnificent Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature and 
Theology37 -  an object study in all that a study of the history of literary culture and its reception can 
teach to the social sciences; Dror Warhman’s extraordinary The Making of the Modern Self38 – which 
shows that virtually every cultural form - translations of the classics, fashions such as the taste for 
masquerade or caricature, even beekeeping manuals – can be mined as resources by the imaginative 
social theorist; and Margot Finn’s fascinating The Character of Credit,39 whose erudition in its tracing 
of the changing forms and significance of credit and debt is matched only by its imaginative scope 
and narrative power. 
 
I have always been intensely curious about the factors – social, institutional, psychological - which 
shape people’s careers, and which in particular determine what they choose to research and write 
about.  In the middle of my career, I had a wonderful opportunity to indulge this curiosity in the 
form of work on Herbert Hart’s biography:40 a project from which I learnt so much and for which I 
feel so intensely grateful that I can barely begin to write about it here.  And I have long joked – like 
most jokes, it has an underlying seriousness – that we academics tend to work on things which 
puzzle or perplex us.  (Which raises some interesting questions about the length of time I have spent 
working on responsibility…!)  As I have engaged in this very privileged opportunity to reflect on my 
own intellectual biography, I am struck by two things.  First, it does seem to me that my initial 
reluctance to read law has been – perhaps most especially in the early part of my career – an 
influential force in inclining me to experiment at the margins of the discipline.  It has of course led 
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me into some risky ventures, and up some blind alleys: I have definitely had moments of wishing I 
could have been the kind of person who was content to work at perfecting my technique of writing 
doctrinal pieces for the establishment law journals.  But not for long. And hence, second, the 
precious opportunity which Phil Thomas and his editorial colleagues have given me in commissioning 
this piece has made me reflect on how profoundly lucky I have been to study law during a time in 
which its boundaries have been expanding and its methodological pluralism has burgeoned.  I have 
always regarded law not so much as a discipline but rather as a fascinating social practice, open to 
analysis from many different points of view and disciplinary perspectives.  I now realise with 
renewed force how much to be treasured is this openness of law.  Amid the increasing pressures to 
formalise our criteria of excellence, may a single hierarchy of journals continue to be resisted; and 
may the pluralism and generosity of the legal academy flourish. 
 
 
 
 
 
